The United States has dealt another devastating blow to Chinese photovoltaic (PV) companies expanding into overseas markets.
On September 11 (local time), the U.S. Department of Commerce issued a final affirmative determination, ruling that crystalline silicon photovoltaic cells and modules (whether or not assembled into modules) from India, Indonesia, and Laos were being dumped in the U.S. at less than fair value and were benefiting from unfair government subsidies. Based on this, the Department of Commerce established high anti-dumping (AD) and countervailing duty (CVD) rates.
Specifically, the combined duty rates reached 233.26% for India, a maximum of 268.06% for Indonesia, and a peak of 218.7% for Laos. This final ruling—dubbed "Solar IV" by the industry—is more than just a set of figures; it is a declaration of intent. The U.S. is shifting from country-level tariffs to product-level tariffs, aiming to block PV products that reach the U.S. market via third-country transshipment.
To understand the full picture of this ruling, it is helpful to look at the details. "Solar IV" marks the fourth major trade remedy action initiated by the U.S. against PV products.
The duty rates warrant a detailed breakdown. Regarding anti-dumping duties, the rates are set at a uniform 123.04% for India, 94.36% for Indonesia, and 65.43% for Laos. For countervailing duties, the rates are 126.09% for India, as high as 173.70% for Indonesia’s PT Blue Sky Solar Indonesia, and 153.67% for Vietnam Sunergy Joint Stock Company in Laos. When the two duties are combined, the total rate reaches 268.06% for Indonesia’s Blue Sky Solar and 218.7% for Laos’s Vietnam Sunergy.
It is worth noting that several of these rates were determined based on the "adverse facts available" rule; this means that because certain companies under investigation did not fully cooperate, the U.S. Department of Commerce utilized presumptive data unfavorable to the investigated parties. Consequently, these exorbitantly high rates contain a punitive element. Even more significant is the fact that the list of companies subject to duties in Laos prominently includes the Laotian subsidiaries of JA Solar and Trina Solar. The origins of this latest round of tariff hikes date back to July 17, 2025, when the American Alliance for Solar Manufacturing Trade Committee—comprising First Solar, Hanwha Qcells USA, and Mission Solar Energy—initiated the "Solar IV" trade investigation. This probe alleged that photovoltaic (PV) products from India, Indonesia, and Laos were subject to dumping and unfair government subsidies.
At its core, the Solar IV case is not merely a trade remedy measure but a move to protect the return on investment for domestic U.S. manufacturing capacity. Since the passage of the Inflation Reduction Act, companies like First Solar have invested billions of dollars in new factories; however, following the imposition of tariffs on four Southeast Asian nations, low-priced products from India, Indonesia, and Laos flooded the U.S. market, continuing to squeeze the profit margins of domestic manufacturers. A direct consequence is the blocking of "circumvention" routes used by Chinese companies to export via third countries. For instance, exports from Laos surged from near-zero in 2022 to $336 million in 2024—an explosive growth driven by the rapid relocation of Chinese PV production capacity.
With the tariff hammer falling, has Southeast Asia been reduced to "expendable collateral"?
Following the final Solar IV ruling, Southeast Asia appeared to lose its status as a transshipment hub overnight. Yet, a closer look reveals a shifting landscape: while the region's role as an export base for PV manufacturing is receding, its role as a consumer market for PV products is on the rise—a trend that truly warrants attention.
Consider the data: in the first two months of 2026, the value of Chinese PV module exports to Southeast Asia rose by 60.8% year-on-year. ASEAN nations purchased $4.1 billion worth of Chinese solar equipment—a nearly 90% increase—securing a 57% share of China's total solar equipment exports to Asia.
Looking at regional market fundamentals, the cumulative installed capacity of PV power plants in Southeast Asia surpassed 85 GW by May 2026, a year-on-year increase of approximately 24%; annual new installations are projected to exceed 28 GW, up about 37% year-on-year. Notably, Indonesia announced a 100 GW PV initiative late last year, accompanied by a demand for approximately 320 GWh of energy storage capacity.
Furthermore, one often-overlooked detail is that the Philippines became China's largest single overseas market for solar panels this year. In the first five months of 2026, China's solar module exports to the Philippines more than doubled year-on-year, with the export value in March surging by 262%. At a technology exhibition in Davao, Philippines, one individual drove for nine hours just to view the latest photovoltaic (PV) products from Chinese companies.
Moreover, the export-manufacturing role of Southeast Asia has not vanished. Industry projections suggest that by the end of 2026, the overseas module production capacity of Chinese PV companies will exceed 150 GW; leveraging its mature supply chain infrastructure and geographical advantages, Southeast Asia remains a vital transit hub for module exports.
However, the crude "pure transit" model is no longer viable; it is being replaced by a dual-driver strategy of "manufacturing plus consumption."
Southeast Asian PV: From Transit Hub to New Frontier
While export channels face blockades due to tariffs, another phenomenon warrants closer attention: the rapid boom of local markets within Southeast Asia. Furthermore, Chinese PV companies are responding much faster than many anticipated.
On January 14 of this year, Risen Energy signed a strategic cooperation agreement with Eco Persona, a Malaysian solar EPC (Engineering, Procurement, and Construction) firm, to jointly develop commercial and industrial rooftop PV projects across four states in northern Malaysia, further accelerating their regional expansion.
In addition, PV companies with roots in the home appliance industry are making aggressive inroads into Southeast Asia. Skyworth began its expansion into Thailand in August 2025 and entered both the Malaysian and Vietnamese markets within a single week in April 2026. In Malaysia, Skyworth PV launched a one-stop model covering branding, supply chain, design, digitalization, operations, and financial support, while adopting a "national service provider plus regional distributor" model in Vietnam.
Similarly, TCL PV launched residential solar solutions in Thailand late last year that offer the simplicity and ease of use characteristic of home appliances, while also providing installation training to over a hundred local partners.
The overseas expansion models of these companies differ fundamentally from the previous wave, which focused on relocating capacity solely to avoid tariffs. That earlier phase was about passive evasion, whereas the current phase is defined by proactive business development.
The Landscape of Overseas Expansion Has Shifted
Returning to the core question: can Chinese PV products still enter the US market following the imposition of escalating tariffs? The answer is yes, but the pathway has been completely restructured. The path of exporting to the U.S. via intermediary channels has become increasingly difficult. In August, the U.S. announced the imposition of minimum import prices and a 15% ad valorem tariff on imported polysilicon, wafers, cells, and modules—effective December 4—while simultaneously authorizing incentives to encourage manufacturing to return to the U.S. This signals a shift from country-specific tariffs to product-level tariffs, drastically narrowing the scope for circumventing restrictions through supply chain "stitching" (assembling components from various sources).
For companies expanding overseas, the options are either to establish direct production capacity—such as through joint ventures within the U.S.—or to pivot to alternative markets; regions like Southeast Asia, the Middle East, and Africa are emerging as viable new destinations.
The final ruling on the Solar IV case is not the end of the road, but a turning point.
For the past decade, the core strategy behind Chinese solar companies' overseas expansion was "circumvention"—delivering products to high-margin markets at the lowest possible cost. Operations in the four Southeast Asian nations, India, Indonesia, and Laos were essentially extensions of this same logic.
However, the imposition of a 268% tariff has signaled the end of this approach. The U.S. has replaced country-specific tariffs with product-level tariffs. To access the U.S. market, Chinese companies must now either shoulder the high costs of localization or shift their focus entirely to other markets.
